Solana-first · everything free today

Proof for every byte.

Your code, your installs, your agents: a receipt anyone can check, instead of a badge you have to trust.

Your cursor is the verifier. Every byte it looks at gets checked; one random byte is spot-checked.

01 · The problem

Old code, new exploits.

The worst breaches hit code everyone already trusted. Mature, widely used, reviewed many times over, and still carrying a flaw for years, until an attacker found it first. Age and reputation are not evidence. A check you can repeat at every commit is.

Shellshock · BashA command-injection flaw sat in Bash for about 25 years; mass scanning began within hours of disclosure.
Heartbleed · OpenSSLA missing bounds check in the web's main TLS library leaked server memory, private keys included, for two years.
Log4Shell · Log4jA lookup feature added in 2013 let a single log line run remote code, in software nearly every Java team ran.
PwnKit · polkitAny local user could become root on most Linux systems, through a bug present since pkexec's first release in 2009.
regreSSHion · OpenSSHA bug fixed in 2006 came back in a 2020 release and opened unauthenticated root code execution on glibc Linux.
Wormhole · SolanaThe bridge checked signatures through a deprecated Solana function; an attacker minted 120,000 wETH, about $320M.

Release · trusted

ce2083f658bb2d80e355b81a8de042a5177add4fa20477da3c9f0164c7399cff61c42699fc5eb12386e95bbe1083e648

Years on · exploited

ce2083f658bb0a2d80e355b81a5a8de042a5177add2c4fa20477b7da3c9f0164a4c7399cff61c4032699fc5eb1002386e95bbe105083e648

✓ audited

8 bytes nobody questioned · exploited after years in production

02 · Commit

Lock the inputs before anyone sees the answer.

The commit, the files, the audit spec, the model id. Hashed into one commitment and written to the log first. From here nothing can quietly change.

commit85c5293e7a01aa43b9cf015986bd7c7188ed4a74

filessrc/lib.rs · Cargo.toml · Xargo.toml (18,402 bytes)

audit specaudit-v1 · sha256 3f9c1a…77be

modelanthropic/claude-sonnet-5.5 · temperature 0

commitment · sha256

fe796ee314cad95530eace9b2e2365942ea4f296a884d9f8eb6c6c7fa755d4b7fe796ee314cad95530eace9b2e2365942ea4f296a884d9f8eb6c6c7fa755d4b7

Written to the log · index 3 · before any model call

03 · Lock the seed

Tie the dice to a block nobody has seen yet.

The seed comes from the commitment and a future Solana block. Neither the customer nor ByteGuard can re-run until the answer is the one they want. One run per commit. No re-rolls.

Solana slot318,200,000target 318,201,004 · chosen when the commitment was logged

seed = H(commitment ‖ block hash)42de78e1aa3d21d103b7302b0328aa074b150533400bfdb0e7b7a7d56492ace7

04 · Run and record

Record the answer, word for word.

Today a hosted model does the audit. Its output is hashed and committed as it comes; the verdict follows from it deterministically.

We do not claim byte-identical re-runs today. That is the Phase 4 upgrade, on a self-hosted deterministic node.

model call 1 · strict JSON · temperature 0● recording

{
  "summary": "The escrow program has one high-severity authorisation gap and two lower-severity issues. None are critical.",
  "findings": [
    { "severity": "high", "category": "signer check",
      "title": "Escrow authority is not required to sign on cancel",
      "file": "src/lib.rs", "line_start": 142, "line_end": 158,
      "fix": "Mark initializer as Signer and add has_one = initializer." },
    { "severity": "medium", "category": "arithmetic",
      "title": "Unchecked multiplication when computing taker amount",
      "file": "src/lib.rs", "line_start": 96, "line_end": 99,
      "fix": "Use checked_mul and return a custom error on overflow." },
    { "severity": "low", "category": "closed-account reuse",
      "title": "Vault closed without zeroing discriminator",
      "file": "src/lib.rs", "line_start": 171, "line_end": 176,
      "fix": "Use Anchor's close constraint." }
  ]
}

output sha256 · committed63f19309dcd7744efb2e269dd54033ae910cf300bd664491382c1a9f37607045verdict, computed from the output: Issues found

05 · Receipt

Sign it into a log nothing leaves.

Every entry gets a one-time hash-based signature (LMS, RFC 8554). Entries hash up a Merkle tree. The root is signed every hour. Daily roots anchored on Solana come in Phase 2.

tree head · size 6 · signed 12:00 UTC

commitcall 1resultcommitcall 1call 2result…

LM-OTSkey 3 → used once1,048,576 one-time keys in this tree

06 · Verify

Check it yourself. In your browser.

Twelve checks, none taken on trust from the server. Signatures, log inclusion, the recomputed verdict, the Solana block.

What a receipt provesThe inputs were committed before the answer was seen; the answer was recorded unchanged; the verdict follows from it.What it does not proveThat the code is safe.A receipt proves the audit ran as stated. It does not prove the code is safe.